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Preliminary Statement: Hayes, Conveyanzchg, says: "If A.
conveyed, at the common law, to the 'children' of B., who had no
child then in being, the conveyance was simply void." No after-
born child could take, owing to the gap in the seisin between
the delivery of the deed and his birth. This gap was contrary
to common-law principles.
Coke, Littletoit 9a: "B. having divers sonnes and daughters, A.
giveth lands to B. et liberis suis, et a lour heires, the father and
all his children do take a fee simple joyntly by force of these
words (their heires) ; but if he had no childe at the time of the
feoffment, the childe borne afterwards shall not take."
Sheppard's Touchstone, *436: "If one devise his land to the
children of I. S. by this devise the children that I. S. hath at
the time of the devise, or at the most the children that I. S.
hath at the time of the death of the testator, and not any of them
that shall be born after his death, shall take."
In Coke's illustration the after-born child is excluded because
the transfer being apparently by common-law conveyance he
would take in defeasance of prior interests. Such a gap in
estates was against mediaeval public policy.2
In Sheppard's illustration the after-born child is not defeated
by any rule of law. The case being one of a devise, the shifting
interest of the after-born child in defeasance of the prior estates
to brothers and sisters-while not permitted at common law--
was good under the Statute of Wills. Therefore a rule of con-
struction based upon the presumed intent of the testator must
operate to eliminate him.
1 (5th ed. 1840) 119. See Kales, Estatcs and Fzthr Intcrcts (2d cd.
1920) sees. 26, 473.
2 Kales, loc. cit.
[785
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
These three extracts serve as a good introduction to the forces
operating in the definition of gifts to classes by way of deeds and
devises of real estate.
Where there is a devis of land to the children of A, and A has
no children at the testator's death, but some are born later: In
spite of some ill-reported remarks in Scatterwood v. Edge,; all
children of A whenever born are held to take. 4 The result may
be supported upon the theory that under such circumstances the
natural meaning of such words as "A's children whenever born",
and that since the Statute of Wills (1540) such a springing in-
terest is good.
Where there is a devise of land to the children of A and A has
some children alive at the date of the will some of whom die
before the testator: Here those alive at the testator's death take
the land to the exclusion of those who died before that time." No
doubt these decisions are based on the view that the testator
means children of A alive at his death. Accordingly if A has no
children at the date of tle will, but some are born to him before
the testator's death, the latter will take the land.
Where there is a devise of land to the childreh of A and A
has some children at the testator's death and some born later:
At common law the shifting interest to the after-born children
was bad. Furthermore, they might be excluded after the Statute
of Wills either on the ground that no limitation capable of taking
effect at common law shall be construed to take 'effect as an
executory devise,0 or upon the ground that the natural meaning
of the words is children born at the testator's death. The weight
of authority excludes the afterborn children of A.8
3 (1699, K. B.) 1 Salk. 229.
4 Shepherd v. Inzgram (1764, Ch.) Ambl. 448 (residue of real and per-
sonal estate).
Upon the application of the Rule in Wild's Case (1599, K. B.) 6 Co. 16,
where there is a devise to "A and his children", A having no children at
the time of the will, see Kales, supra note 1, at secs. 561, 562.
If there be a conveyance by deed to the children of A, and A has no
children at the date of delivery, the conveyance may be held void for
uncertainty. See 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) 1595.
tiStires v. Van Rensselaer (1852, N. Y.) 2 Bradf. Surro. 172; Robinson
v. MeDiarmid (1882) 87 N. C. 455. The rule is the same in personal
property. Viner v. Francis (1789) 2 Cox Ch. 190.
6 Challis, Real Property (3d ed. 1887) *123.
7 Theobald,- Wills (7th ed. 1908) 310.
sSingleton v. Gilbert (1784) 1 Cox. Ch. 68; Scott v. Harvood (1821,
Ch.) 5 Mad. 332; semble; Wyman v. Johnson (1900) 68 Ark. 369, 59 S. W.
250; Wood v. MeGuire (1854) 15 Ga. 202; Faloon v. Simshauser (1880)
130 Ill. 649, 22 N. E. 835 (deed); Biggs v. McCarty (1882) 86 Ind. 352;
Loockerman v. McBlair (1847, Md.) 6 Gill, 177; but see Benson v. Wright
(1848) 4 Md. Ch. 278, where it does not appear whether the property was
realty or personalty. Coogler v. Crosby (1911) 89 S. C, 508, 72 S. E. 149;
Wills v. Foltz (1907) 61 W. Va. 262, 56 W. Va. 473. Contra: Coolk v. Cook
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Where there is a devise of land to A for life and then to the chil-
dren of A who attain twenty-one: Here Mr. Kales has shown that
as the testator is looking forward to a gift in the future he means,
not only children of A living at his own death but all children of
A attaining the given age no matter when.o In Purefoy v.
Rogers,10 however, Lord Hale said: "where a contingency is
limited to depend on an estate of freehold which is capable of
supporting a remainder, it shall never be construed to be an ex-
ecutory devise, but a contingent remainder only, and not other-
wise." The result of a strict application of this rule in England
is that, whether or not any of A's children have obtained a
vested interest prior to his death, none of those reaching the re-
quired age after A's death may take.1
If, however, the testator has himself split the devise to A's
children into two classes, one of which is to reach the age of
twenty-one before A's death and the other one after A's death,
the latter class takes by executory devise.'- The Massachusetts
court allowed all children of A to take although some reached the
required age after A's death, and although the testator did not
divide the gift.13
Contingent Remainder Acts. Thirteen states, as well as Eng-
land, have complete contingent remainder acts."4 No decisions
involving facts similar to the case last supposed have been found
which have arisen in England or those states since the passing
(1706, Ch.) 2 Vern. 545; Lynn v. Hall (1897) 101 Ky. 738, 43 S. W. 402;
Goodridge v. Schafer (1902) 24 Ky. L. R. 219, 68 S. W. 411.
Where the conveyance is to "the children of A born and to be born",
and A has children at the execution of the deed and some born later,
see Kales, supra note 1, at sec. 476.
9 Kales, supra note 1, at sec. 99.
10 (1681, K. B.) 2 Saund. 380, 388.
"'Festing v. Allen (1843, Exch.) 12 Blees. & W. 279; Rhodes v. White-
head (1865, Oh.) 2 Dr. & Sm. 532; Jarman, Wills (5th ed. 1881) 832;
Blackman v. Fysh [1892] 3 Ch. Div. 209, 223.
12 In re Lechmere and Lloyd (1881) 18 Ch. Div. 524; Dean v. Dcan
(1891) 3 Ch. Div. 150. Cf. White v. Summers [1908] 2 Ch. Div. 256.
"3 Simonds v. Simonds (1908) 199 Mass. 552, 85 N. E. 860. In Missouri
the same result, giving full effect to the intention of the testator, was
reached where the provisions were to A for life, remainder to the children
of B. Buckmer v. Buckner (1914) 255 Mo. 371, 164 S. W. 513. Cf. Hay-
ward v. Spaulding (1908) 75 N. H. 92, 71 AtL 219. But see Archer v.
Jacobs (1904) 125 Iowa, 467, 101 N. W. 195.
'. Kales, supra note 1, at sec. 106.
In England a contingent remainder act was passed in 1877, 40 & 41
Vict. c. 33. "A doubt has long existed, and still remains, whether the
act of 1877 applied where the remainder was to the children of a life
tenant who reached twenty-one and one child had reached twenty-one
before the termination of a life estate and others were in esso who might
do so afterwards. Williams on Seisin, 205; Jarman on Wills, (6th ed. by
Sweet), 1445; Vaizey, Law of Settlements, 1164, 1165. The point was
left undecided in In re Robson [1916] 1 Ch. 116." Kales, loc. cit.
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of these acts, 1 with the exception of the Kentucky case next to be
noticed.
In Kentucky it is provided by statute that: "A contingent re-
mainder shall, in no case, fail for the want of a particular estate
to support it." 16 In Laughlin v. Elliott,17 a deed of real and
personal estate reserved a life estate to the grantor, thereafter
gave a life estate in the grantee, and after the death of the latter
divided the property between the grandchildren of the grantor.
The court held that the final gift, including as it did after-born
grandchildren, was too remote. Here in construction the testa-
tor's intent was given free play, untrammelled by any rules of
law.
Where the future interests to the children are equitable. If
the limitations are in trust for A for life, and after his death
upon trust to convey the land to such of the children of A as
attain twenty-one, no rule of destructibility applies. The natural
meaning of the words in the gift to the children is unhampered
by any rules of law. The decisions admitting those of the chil-
dren attaining twenty-one after the death of A, as well as those
who have attained that age before A's death, show conclusively
that the words properly interpreted mean all A's children who
satisfy the condition, no matter when.
8
Suppose there is a future gift with no intervening interest. In
Ballard v. Ballard"9 there was a devise of land to the testator's
two sons and daughter for ten years and after the expiration of
the ten years to his grandchildren by them., The case arose at
common law before the passage of any Massachusetts statute in
regard to contingent remainders.20  Some grandchildren were
born before the testator died, some during the ten year period,
and one after that period. The court did not discuss the rule in
Purefoy v. Rogers.2 The limitations to unborn grandchildren
were incapable of taking effect as contingent remainders because
'5 The case was noted but not passed on in In re Robson [1916] 1 Ch. Div.
116, 121-122.
10 Ky. Sts. 1922, sec. 2346.
1.7 (1924) 202 Ky. 433, 259 S. W. 1031.
18Astley v. Micklethwait (1880) 15 Ch. Div. 59; In re Freme [18913 3
Ch. Div. 167; In re Robson, supra note 15; 2 Jarman, Wills (6th ed. 1910)
1691-1692; Challis, supra note 6, at 122; Taylor v. Crosson (1916) 11 Del.
Ch. 145. Cf. Quinlan v. Wickman (1908) 233 Ill. 39 (mixed fund); Alden-
difer v. Wylie (1923) 306 Ill. 426 (mixed fund); Ward v. Van der Loeif
[1924] A. 0. 653 (mixed fund).
19 (1836, Mass.) 18 Pick. 41.
20 Rev. Sts. 1836, c. 59, Section 7; Acts 1916, c. 108.
21 Op. cit. supra note 10, "where a contingency is limited to depend on
an estate of freehold which is capable of supporting a remainder, it shall
never be construed to be an executory devise, but a contingent remainder
only, and not otherwise." This rule has been expressed more broadly as
follows: . . . "it is a certain principle of law, that, wherever such a
construction can be put upon a limitation, as that it may take effect by
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there was no freehold to support them. Hence they were good
as executory devises.22 The court admitted the child born after
the ten year period to share with the other members of the class.
No rules of law defeating intent influenced the decision. Owing
to the fact that the particular estate was a term for years no
special significance can be given to that interest, and the future
interests of the grandchildren could be dealt with irrespective of
it. The result was that children "whenever born" was held to
be the natural meaning of the words.
In Black v. Black2 3 the testator provided that the real estate
should be held by the executors until his youngest grandchild
should attain twenty-one, when the land should be sold and the
proceeds and accumulations be divided among his grandchildren
then alive. The youngest of the grandchildren alive at the testa-
tor's death reached twenty-one. Some of the testator's children
were then still living. It was contended that the time for division
had arrived. The court held, however, that the distribution of
the property must be postponed until the youngest grandchild of
the testator that might still be born attained.twenty-one.
Certain Cases where the Subject Matter was Per.sonalty: Cases
arising under the disposition of personal property to members
of a class seldom throw clear light upon the actual intent of the
testator. The character of the property requires that no further
members of the class be admitted to share in the principal
after the first period of division.2 -4  This rule is one which fre-
quently defeats the intent of testators.25 Two types of cases are,
however, of distinct value in determining the probable thoughts
of most testators, whether they are disposing of real or personal
property.
The first type arises from a comparison of Gilmore v. Severn, 0
and Davidson v. Dallas.2 7 In Gilmore v. Severn there was a be-
quest of 350 £ to the children of the testator's sister Jane to be
paid to them at twenty-one in equal shares; and, in case any of
them should die under twenty-one, their shares to go to the
survivors. At the testator's death Jane had two children. An-
other child was born later. Sir Lloyd Kenyon was of the opinion
way of remainder, it shall never take place as a springing use, or execu-
tory devise." Carwardine v. Carwardine (1758, Ch.) 1 Eden, *27, *34.
22 Gore v. Gore (1722, K. B.) 2 P. Wms. 28.
23 (1904) 21 Sup. Ct. Cape of Good Hope, 555. And see Boughton v.
Boughton (1848) 1 H. L. Cas. *406 (mixed fund); Webber v. Jones (1900>
94 Me. 429, 47 Atl. 903 (mixed fund); see cases cited infraz note 38.
-The applications of this rule are fully described in Kales, supra note
1 at sees. 563-570; Hawkins, WiUs (2d ed. 1912) 92-105.
25 2 Jarman, supr note 18, at 1665.
26 (1785) 1 Bro. Ch. *582. Cf. Oppzlzcin v,. Henry (1853, Ch.) 10 Hare,.
*441.
27 (1808, Ch.) 14 Ves. 576.
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that the third child born during the infancy of the other two was
entitled to share.
In Davidson v. Dallas there was a devise of 3000 £ to the chil-
dren of the testator's brother Robert to be equally divided among
them, and, if any of them should die before twenty-one, his
share was to go to th1 survivors. At the testator's death there
were six children of his brother, the eldest of whom was fourteen
years of age. Since his death two other children were born.
Lord Eldon decreed that those children only of the testator's
brother who were living at the death of the testator were entitled
to share. In order to protect the gift to survivors the principal
of the fund could not be handed over to the guardians of these
six at the testator's death, but must be retained in the hands of
fiduciaries. It is, therefore, hard to see why children born after
the testator's death and until the eldest reached twenty-one should
not have been admitted as much in Davidson v. Dallas as in Gil-
more v. Severn.
28
The following distinction is suggested as the only one that can
be drawn between the two cases. If "children of A" means chil-
dren at the death of the testator, then Davidson v. Dallas stands
firmly on that ground, and there is no rule of convenience to dis-
turb that result. On the other hand, where, as in Gilmore v,
Severn, the testator has imported into the gift by the words "to
be paid to them . . . as they should respectively attain
twenty-one," an element of futurity, it may be fairly said that
he meant to include all after-born children, and this meaning is
cut down by the rule of convenience to include only those who
compose the class at the first period of division. Davidson v.
Dallas, then, would seem to be a solid decision that "children"
means children alive at the testator's death, if there be any such
children.
29
28 2 Jarman, op. cit. supra note 11, at 1010, note 5: "But as the gift
over necessarily suspends the distribution until the eldest attains twenty-
one (as to which, however, see Fawkes v. Grey, 18 Ves. 131), ought not
the children born in the interval to have been let in, seeing that these
rules always aim at including as many objects as possible?"
29 But see Hawkins, supra note 24, at 90: "It might be supposed that a
gift to the children of a person simpliciter, would include all the children
he might have, whenever coming into existence; but the testator is con-
sidered to intend the objects of his bounty to be ascertained at as early
a period as possible; and it may be laid down as a general rule (quali-
fied by the other rules which follow in this chapter) that, a devise or
bequest to the children of A., or of the testator, means, prima facio, the
children in existence at the testator's death: provided there are such chil-
-dren then in existence."
This rule is described as a rule of convenience in Theobald, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 306. See In re Powell [18981 1 Ch. 227, 228. 2 Jarman, op. cit.
supra note 18, at 1665. "The rule usually defeats the intention of testa-
tors, and the tendency of the Courts is not to apply it unless it is
necessary."
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The second type of case that is instructive is illustrated by
three cases on gifts of income.
In re Wenmoth's Estate" presented the following problem:
There was a bequest of residue of personal property upon trust
to apply income between the testator's grandchildren on attain-
ing the age of'twenty-one for life. On the death of any grand-
child (except the last survivor) dying with issue, such grand-
child's share of income should be paid to his children, who being
sons should attain twenty-one or being daughters should attain
that age or marry. After the death of the last surviving grand-
child the residue was to be divided equally among the testator's
then living great grandchildren who attained twenty-one. The
testator's son had eleven children, of whom eight were alive at
the time of suit. Of these eight five were born in the testator's
lifetime, and the eldest became twenty-one in 1883. Two were
born after the testator's death and before the eldest grandchild
attained twenty-one. One was born in 1387. The question raised
was, to what grandchildren did the gift of the income apply?
Chitty, J., held that any child at any time attaining ftenty-one
was entitled to a share of the income. He distinguished a gift
of corpus where there is but one period of division from the
distribution of income where the division is periodical; and said
that each member of the class, as soon as he became entitled, too!:
his share of the income, and there was no reason why the rule
should be applied beyond each periodical payment. The decree
gave tb the three grandchildren then of age each one-eighth of
the income, and reserved the other five-eighths for the remain-
ing five grandchildren in accordance with the terms of the will
for investment, maintenance and advancement.'
In re Powel -'2 is as follows: The testator gave all his residuary
estate to tzistees upon trust to divide into three equal portions
and to pay one-third of the income of his estate equally between
the children of his sister during their lives, and after their deaths
to divide one-third part of the estate equally among their chil-
dren; but if they should all die without having children, then
over. The testator died in 1879. His sister, then over eighty,
died in 1833. She had several children, one of whom died leaving
children. The question was whether the gift to the children of
the children of his sister was void for remoteness. Mr. Justice
Kekewich held-it valid, because the gift of the income was to
children living at the testator's death and did not, although it
was a -ift of income only, include objects born later. The learned
Judge said that the natural meanhing of the word "children" was
children alive at the testator's death, citing Hawkins on Wills.
20 (1897) 37 Ch. Div. 266.
"1 See In ;e Stcph:cns [1904J 1 Ch. Div. 322, 330.
2 Sup a note 29.
3 Szupro note .29.
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He 'distinguished In re Wenmoth's Estate" on the ground that
there the gift was to children at the given age, in which case, if
the gift were of the corpus, the rule of convenience was properly
applicable t6 cut down all children, to those existing at the first
period of division, and it was this rule that Mr. Justice Chitty
refused to extend to a gift of income. Mr. Justice Rekewich
said, on page 231: "I do not think it occurred to him to consider
in any way whether it would be right to depart from the rule as
to children being ascertained at the testator's death because they
were only interested in income, . , ."
In re Carter in the Court of Appeal of New Zealand-- contains
a discussion of both decisions. The testator bequeathed his busi-
ness of sheep-farming upon trust to pay the remainder of the in-
come, after payment of annuities, to the grandchildren of
his late half-brother John Walker and the grandchildren of his
half-sister Elizabeth Htogg in equal shares. One question raised
by the request for instructions was whether two grandchildren
of John Walker who were born after the death of the testator
were entitled to interests under the will.
In the Supreme Court, Stout, C. J., held that In re Powell con-
trolled, that In re Wenmoth's Estate was to be distinguished
tipon the ground that there the testator had imported an element
of futurity into the gift by designating that the objects thereof
were to receive their legacies of income at twenty-one.
The case was taken to the Court of Appeal. There all four
judges agreed that there was sufficient special context in the
whole will to warrant a reversal of the Chief Justice and an
admission of the two younger grandchildren to a share in the
income;- but all four gave full opinions that In re Powell was
wrong3 7 and that In re Wenmoth's Estate represented the better
34 Supra note 30.
35 See Gray, Rule against Perpetuities (3d ed. 1915) see. 641.
re (1911) 30 N. Z. L. R. 707.
37 Mr. Justice Edwards in In re Carter, supra note 36 at 724-725, justi-
fies In re Powell solely upon the ground that there is an ambiguity in
the phrase "the children of A" and even in the case of income the Rule
against Perpetuities which was in issue in that case might serve to re-
strict the first gift to the children alive at the testator', death in order
to save the gift over. It was upon this ground that Chik'ty, J., in In re
Wenmoth's Estate put aside, as not in point, Elliott v. Elliott (1841, Ch.)
12 Sim. 276, and In re Coppard's Estate (1887) 35 Ch. Div. 350. See
In re Wenmoth's Estate, supra note 30, at 270-271. Chitcy, J., declines
to decide the question of remoteness of the interests of the great-grand-
children as being premature. But might it not have affected the con-
struction of the gift to the grandchildren? See Gray, too. cit. ,vtpra note 35,
In a few other cases of gifts of personal property the rule 6f convenience
is not applied. If there is a gift to the children of A and there are no
children of A alive at the testator's death, all children of; A, not merely
the first born, are admitted. Weld v. Bradbury (1715, Chi) 2 Vern. 705;
Armitage v. Williams (1859, Oh.) 27 Beav. 346. If ther'e is a gift to A
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view in all cases of gifts to children whether the testator had
postponed payment or not. The effect of this dictum is that the
natural meaning of a gift "to children" is "children whenever
born," that this meaning is given full play where the gift is of
income or where there are no children alive at the testator's
death but is restricted by the rule of convenience in those cases
where there are children alive when the will takes effect.
Can this dictum, supported only by In re Wemnoth's Estate,
which is in fact distinguishable from In re Powell stand against
the combined effect of Gibizore v. Severn and Davidson v. Dallas
together with In re Powell? It is submitted that it cannot, and
that the primary meaning based upon the expectations of the
majority of testators of a gift to children where some are in
existence at the death of the testator is "children only who are
then alive".
Where there is a gift to the children of A ,hen the youngest
attains twenty-one, or to grandchildren when the youngest at-
tains a certain age. Does "youngest" here mean the youngest of
the class in existence at the testator's death, or the youngest of
the members of a class living at any particular time, or the
youngest ever born? The weight of authority tends to establish
the last meaning, although it is by no means clear in many of
the cases whether the court meant to distinguish between the
second and the last interpretations.3 That it refers to children
or grandchildren whenever born seems the most natural meaning
when the testator has imported an element of futurity into the
gift by the postponement until a certain age is reached. The
second meaning, while doubtless to be favored from the point of
view of convenience, is not a natural construction where the will
is so simply expressed.
SUMMARY
The following propositions are submitted with regard to the
testator's meaning in a devise of real estate to the children of A.
for life and then to the children of B, and at A's death B, though living,
has no children, all children of B, not merely the first born, are admitted.
Theobald, suprai note 7, at 307; 2 Jarman, supra note 18, at 1692.
- Estate of Van Wck: (1921) 185 Calif. 49, 196 Pac. 50; Aldc cdifc" v.
Wylie, supra note 18; Cayzood v. Jones (1903, Ky. C. A.) 32 Ky. L. Rep.
1302, 108 S. W. 888; Webbe" v,. Jones (1900) 94 Me. 429, 47 At. 903; Fo.-
eicl: v. Fosdick (1863, Mass.) 6 Allen, 41; Kate r. lWalker (1912) 82
N. J. L. 157, S2 Atl. 301; McLa .ighli v. Yin gling (1923) 90 Ol:a. 159,
213 Pac. 552; Hughes z,. Hghes (1791) 3 Bro. Ch. 352; s. c. 434; MaMin-
,uarhng v. Beevor (1849, Ch.) S Hare, 44; Gooch v. Gooch (1853, Ch.) 3
Do G. M. & G. 366; Arimitage v. Wilams, supp-a note 37; In rc PL-ington
(1892, Ireland) L. R. 29 Ch. Div. 370; Will of WilLie (1901) 19 N. Z. 531;
In re Stevens [1912] Vict. L. R. 194, [1922] Viet. L. P, 771, and [19231]
Vict. L. R. 584. To the same effect see Keles, szpra note 1 at see. 569. For
a comment on In re Ste,%ces see (1924) 37 HLirv. L. RE-v. 037.
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1. "To the children of A", there being none in existence at
the time of the testator's death, means to all the children of A,
whenever born.
2. If there are children alive at the testator's death, the nat-
ural meaning of his words is, those children whom he may be
assumed to know, as distinguished from those whom he does not;
and that those alive at his death alone take.
3. "To A for life, remainder to A's children who attain twenty-
one". Here tlhe testator has projected the gift into the future
in two ways, (a) by postponing it until after A's death, (b) by
postponing it until the children attain twenty-one. He therefore
means to include all children whenever born who attain the given
age.
4. "To the children of A who attain twenty-one". Here an ele-
ment of futurity is incorporated into the definition of the devises;
and hence all children attaining the age are meant.
5. "To A for life and then to the children of B". A more
difficult case is here presented. The testator has not incorporated
into the definition of the legatees an element of futurity. From
that point of view it might be argued that the situation closely
resembles an immediate devise to the children of A. Hence, if
there are children of B born before A's death, those born after-
wards are not intended to take; whereas, if B has had no children
by that time, all are admitted, whenever born. It is submitted,
however, that the testator is looking to the future. He can not
be assumed to have preferred one class which he knows to another
class with which he is unacquainted, as in the case of an im-
mediate gift; and that, therefore, all children of B whenever
born are to share, irrespective of the state of B's family at A's
death.39 The same result should be reached in a devise "to the
children of A ten years / hence".
Contra,: Seitz v. Faversham (1912) 205 N. Y. 197; semble: Toher v.
Crounse (1907, N. Y. Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 57 Misc. 252, aff'd, without opinion,
(1908, 3d Dept.) 127 App. Div. 934; Cogan v. McCabe (1898, N. Y. Spec.
T.) 23 Misc. 739. The New York cases were influenced by the New York
statute of perpetuities. See Simpson v. Cook (1877) 24 Minn. 180; Kovern
-v. Williams (1832, Ch.) 5 Sim. 171; Elliott v. Elliott (1841, Oh.) 12 Sim.
276; In re Coppard's Estate (1887) 35 Ch. Div. 350; Gray, op. cit. supra
note 35, at sec. 638-640.
39 If a child of B is born before A's death, his interest becomes vested,
and in the event of his predeceasing A, passes to his heirs. Kales, op. cit.
supra note 1, at sec. 565.
